















Agency Cost of Debt and Lending Market Competition:
A Re-Examination
The views expressed are those of the authors and do not necessarily correspond to the views of
the Bank of Finland
* Research Department, Bank of Finland, P.O.Box 160, FIN 00101 Helsinki, Finland. E-mail:
erkki.koskela@bof.fi









Agency Cost of Debt and Lending Market
Competition: A Re-Examination
Bank of Finland Discussion Papers 12/2000
Erkki Koskela – Rune Stenbacka
Research Department
Abstract
We address how lending market competition, measured by banks’ bargaining
power, affects the agency costs of debt finance. We show that the threshold for
obtaining loan finance is independent of the relative bargaining power of the
financier. Moreover, intensified lending market competition leads to lower
lending rates and to investment return distributions with lower and less risky
returns. Hence increased lending market competition reduces the agency cost of
debt financing. Our analysis does not support the view that there is a tradeoff
between more intensive lending market competition and higher agency costs of
debt finance.
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Lainamarkkinoiden kilpailun vaikutus velan
agentuurikustannuksiin
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Erkki Koskela – Rune Stenbacka
Tutkimusosasto
Tiivistelmä
Tutkimuksessa analysoidaan, mikä vaikutus pankkien neuvotteluvoimalla mitatul-
la lainamarkkinoiden kilpailulla on projektien velkarahoituksen agentuurikustan-
nuksiin. Vaikka lainarahoituksen saanti projekteihin ei riipu pankin neuvotteluvoi-
masta, kasvavan kilpailun lainamarkkinoilla osoitetaan johtavan alempiin laina-
korkoihin ja sitä kautta heikompituottoisiin, mutta pienempiriskisiin projekteihin.
Näin ollen lisääntyvä kilpailu lainamarkkinoilla supistaa velkarahoituksen agen-
tuurikustannuksia. Tämä on vastoin melko tavanomaista käsitystä, jonka mukaan
intensiivisempi kilpailu lainamarkkinoilla olisi yhteiskunnan kannalta haitallista,
koska se lisää velkarahoituksen agentuurikustannuksia.
Asiasanat: pankkikilpailu, velan agentuurikustannukset
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1 Introduction
A dominant approach in modern research on credit markets starts from
recognizing asymmetric information as an important source of fundamental
imperfections in these markets. The magnitude of these imperfections determines
how efficiently the credit market performs as a channel whereby projects
generating high (social or private) returns are realized and whereby low-return
projects are denied financing. Debt contracts incorporate a conflict of interest
between lenders and borrowers and therefore this type of financial contracts forms
the basis for an agency relationship between debtholders and projectholders. This
contractual relationship causes agency costs because the investors cannot typically
commit themselves to credibly act in the interest of lenders. Agency costs
generated by debt financing imply that project selection will be distorted relative
to the first-best benchmark of maximizing the expected project surplus in a world
where agency-based incentive problems could be eliminated.
For more than two decades an extensive literature in financial economics has
investigated various aspects of the agency costs of debt with a particular focus on
exploring the implications of these agency costs for the optimal financial structure
of firms (see Harris and Raviv (1991) for a comprehensive survey). Much less
attention, however, has been paid to the fundamental issue of how competition in
the lending market will impact on the agency costs of debt. In the present study
we will systematically address precisely this issue by directly posing the
following questions. Will an increased degree of competition between lenders
promote efficiency of credit markets by reducing the agency costs of debt and will
it, as is frequently argued, lead to increased credit market fragility in the sense of
increasing the equilibrium bankruptcy risk of borrowers? Answers to these
questions are central for all attempts to evaluate the potential welfare gains from
the ongoing worldwide process of financial integration. For example, within the
framework of the European Union one of the main goals of promoting financial
integration, the process of which has culminated with a single banking license and
common numeraire in the EMU-countries from the beginning of 1999, was to
encourage competition in banking. This policy development can be seen in light
of a number of influential studies such as the so-called Cecchini report (Price,
Waterhouse (1988)) or the European Commission Study (Emerson (1992)), which
LQWHUDOLD emphasize the benefits of increased competition.
With the focus on loan markets a number of recent contributions has analysed
important aspects of the relationship between lending market structure and credit
market performance. Broecker (1990) and Riordan (1993) have studied the
consequences of adverse selection resulting from the unobserved characteristics of
borrowers. They argue that increased competition may make adverse selection
problems more severe when borrowers that have been rejected at one bank can
apply for loans at other banks so that the pool of funded projects will exhibit
lower average quality as the number of banks increases.
1 Shaffer (1998) has
extended the analysis of winner’s curse problems in lending and has also reported
empirical evidence about the nature and magnitude of these effects. Contrary to
                                                
1 Gehrig (1998) as well as Kanniainen and Stenbacka (1998) extend this approach within the
framework of models making it possible to explore the relationship between the incentives of
banks for costly information acquisition based on ex ante monitoring efforts and the market
structure of the banking industry.8
the contributions mentioned above, by identifying the intensity of competition
with the degree of product differentiation under asymmetric information Villas-
Boas and Schmidt-Mohr (1999) have demonstrated how banks facing stronger
competition may expose credit applicants to more precise screening. The central
mechanism behind the result of Villas-Boas and Schmidt-Mohr relies on the
argument that with stronger competition the banks have to compete more
aggressively for the profitable projects. Therefore, welfare may actually decrease
as competition becomes more intense.
In contrast to the models focusing on adverse selection, Koskela and
Stenbacka (2000) use a model of mean-shifting investment technologies to study
the relationship between market structure, risk taking and social welfare in
lending markets. In their approach introduction of competition has been shown to
reduce lending rates and to generate higher investments without increasing the
equilibrium bankruptcy risk of borrowers. Thus, with investment volumes
endogenized there need not be a tradeoff between market competition and
financial fragility.
In a credit-rationing model that takes a Schumpeterian R&D perspective
Petersen and Rajan (1995) have argued that credit market competition imposes
constraints on the ability of borrowers and lenders to intertemporally share the
surplus from investment projects so that lenders in a more competitive lending
market may be forced to initially charge higher interest rates than lenders with
more market power. Thus, as the market power of the bank increases, firms with
lower credit quality obtain finance. In a different vein Dewatripont and Maskin
(1995), who model the initial project choice as a problem of adverse selection and
refinancing as one of moral hazard, have emphasized how credit market
competition can offer a way not to refinance bad projects thus discouraging
investors from undertaking them initially. Besanko and Thakor (1993) and von
Thadden (1995)) have shown how banks with more market power might have
stronger incentives to monitor the projects of borrowers and to establish long-term
relationships. Subsequently, in the process of lending, the bank acquires
information about borrowers’ creditworthiness, which will constitute the basis for
an informational monopoly relative to the bank’s clients (see, also Dell’Ariccia
(1998)). Insofar as creditworthy borrowers are unable to signal their quality to
competing lenders, they are locked in a bank-client relationship and forced to pay
borrowing rates above the competitive level.
Clearly, the existing literature gives mixed results concerning the relationship
between lending market competition, interest rates  and welfare. Therefore the
relationship between credit market competition and the generated agency costs of
debt is in need of further exploration. The present article offers a new analysis
making it possible to explicitly address how lending market competition,
measured by the bargaining power of banks, affects the agency costs of debt
finance. In such a setting, we show that  more intense competition in lending
markets will decrease the interest rates and lead to less risky investment projects
with a lower rate of return conditional on success as long as the credit market does
not face “too strong” adverse selection problems. Thus the agency costs generated
by debt financing will decrease with more intense competition in lending markets.
This is in contrast with the finding by Petersen and Rajan (1995), who argue that
more intense competition raises interest rates within an intertemporal framework
of project funding.9
We proceed as follows. The basic model of moral hazard describing the
determination of investment projects for a given interest rate is presented in
section 2. This section also delineates the first-best project selection as the
benchmark for the evaluation of the impact of increasing degrees of lending
market competition. Section 3 explores how the lending rate determination
depends on the degree of competition. Here we formalize an analogy to the role
played by bargaining power in wage negotiations in labor markets by modeling
the lending rate determination as a solution to a Nash bargaining problem between
a lender and a borrower. In section 4 we elaborate the relationship between the
agency cost generated by debt financing and bank competition. Finally there is a
brief concluding section.
2 A basic model of moral hazard
Consider an entrepreneur facing an investment opportunity, which requires
exactly one unit of debt money.
2 The investment yields a random return x.
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The probability of success, p(R), is assumed to be a decreasing and convex
function of the rate of return, R, so that p’(R) < 0 and p’’(R) > 0. (2.1) is a general
representation of the available investment opportunities and captures the natural
feature that a higher rate of return can be achieved by sacrificing in terms of the
success probability. In order to achieve analytical tractability for our analysis, and
thereby also to exhibit the underlying economic intuition as transparently as
possible, we will formally restrict our analysis to the following specification:
. e ) R ( p
) 1 R ( - l - = (2.2)
The parameter l captures the hazard rate of the project with the property that
p’(R) = –lp(R) < 0 and p’’(R) = l
2p(R) > 0.
3 This functional form of the
probability of success can be viewed as a reflection of a tradeoff whereby a more
complex project generates a higher return conditional on success, but that the
probability of success diminishes with project complexity. It can also be seen to
exhibit a moral hazard effect. For instance, the effort of the entrepreneur, which is
                                                
2 Since the analysis is focused on the relationship between lending market competition and the
agency costs of debt, we directly restrict our attention to debt as the only available financial
instrument without attempting to make the financial structure of firms an endogenous feature of
our model. We regard this justified in light of the fact that a large number of studies in financial
economics has concentrated on that issue. Also, we abstract from issues related to equilibrium
credit rationing and refer to Bester and Hellwig (1987) for an extensive treatment of credit
rationing in the context of moral hazard.
3 In what follows the derivatives are noted by primes for functions with one argument and the
partial derivatives by subscripts for functions with many arguments. Hence, for example p’(R) =
dp(R)/dR, while Ax(x,y) = ¶A(x,y)/¶x, etc.10
not directly observable by the lender, may be a decreasing function of the interest
rate (for an elaboration of this effect, see e.g. Clemenz (1986), 65–66).
The investor, assumed to be risk-neutral, finances the project with a debt
contract governed by the principle of limited liability. The investor makes the
project selection, R, so as to maximize the expected profit
[] , ) r 1 ( R ) R ( p + - = p (2.3)
where 1+r describes the interest rate factor. When the lender has committed itself
to the debt contract, the projectholder’s first-order optimality condition can be
expressed as
() [] . 0 ) R ( p r 1 R ) R ( ’ p R = + + - = p (2.4)
Under the assumptions made, the second order condition pRR < 0 holds so that
(2.4) implicitly defines the optimal project selection, R*. This is structurally
determined by (i) a moral hazard factor (i.e. the size of p’, which incorporates the
parameter l) and (ii) the interest rate, r. Using the specification (2.2) the optimal
project selection can be explicitly written as
(),
1
r 1 * R
l
= + - (2.5)
which means that, if successful, the investor’s optimal project selection is
associated with a rate of return exhibiting a premium relative to the cost of debt
finance and that premium decreases with the hazard rate l. It is easy to see that a
higher interest rate leads to a higher rate of return being realized conditional on
success, i.e.  0 R
*
r > . However, a higher interest rate implies a higher moral hazard
effect through the selection of riskier investment projects
4 with lower probability
of success. Furthermore, the interest rate elasticity of the project selection,
()
* *
r R / r 1 R + , increases with the interest rate.
A slightly more general way of describing project selection would be to
assume that a project with a risk characteristic q yields a random return R(q) with
probability p(q) and zero with probability 1–p(q). Under such circumstances the
project’s expected return varies with the chosen risk-return characteristics. It
would be reasonable to assume that R’(q) > 0 so that the return in the case of
success is higher as q increases, while the probability of success decreases, i.e.
p’(q) < 0. Such a formulation, however, leads to similar results as those reported
in the present analysis.
5
The bank is assumed to be risk neutral and we assume that the opportunity
cost of granting loans is zero. Consequently, the expected profits of the bank can
be written as
. 1 ) r 1 )( R ( p V - + = (2.6)
                                                
4 See Stiglitz and Weiss (1981) for a seminal article about this effect.
5 This kind of specification has been used in a different context  by de Meza and Webb (1999).11
As we will see later on, the determination of the lending rate, r, depends on the
relative bargaining power of the bank vis-a-vis the investor. It turns out to be
useful to study this question, as we will do in Section 3, by using the Nash
bargaining approach. Such an approach incorporates the lending market structures
of perfect competition and monopoly as special cases, and, what is important,
allows us also to consider the full spectrum of intermediate degrees of
competition. In the case of a lending monopoly, the bank sets the interest rate
subject to the constraint determined by optimal project selection by the investor.
Similarly, with perfect competition the interest rate is determined by the
contestability condition with the expected zero profit for the bank.
2.1 The socially efficient project selection: a benchmark
Before initiating the analysis of the implications of changes in the degree of
lending market competition for the interest rate and project selection, including
the rate of return under success as well as the implied riskiness, it is useful to
characterize a benchmark of the socially efficient project selection. Maximization
of expected project surplus in a world where agency-based incentive problems
could be eliminated constitutes a natural candidate for such a benchmark.
The socially efficient project selection (in a first-best sense) can be obtained
as a solution to the following maximization problem
, 1 R ) R ( p W MaxR - = (2.7)
from which we can conclude that the resulting project selection, R = R
FB, has to
satisfy R
FB = 1/l. Such a socially efficient project selection will generate an










Equation (2.8) indicates that for the project to be socially efficient, i.e. W
FB > 0,
the probability of success p, which depends on the choice of project, has to exceed
the hazard rate l of the project, which describes how the probability of success
diminishes with the project complexity. From a social point of view it is justified
to implement a project if p(R
FB) > l, while the projects with p(R
FB) < l should not
be implemented, since these generate a negative expected surplus. Figure 1
describes the relationship between project selection, R, and the probability of
success, p(R). The social surplus is positive for R < R











- = . If we had a distribution of
projects differing according to their inherent technological properties as captured
by the hazard rate, l
FB would determine the critical hazard rate above which it
would be socially efficient to implement the project.
What is the relationship between the socially efficient project selection and
the project the investor implements? Clearly, the nature of the project determines
whether it creates value so as to justify its implementation. Equation (2.5)
characterizes how optimal behavior on behalf of the projectholder will translate a12
particular debt contract (with interest rate r) and a particular type of project
(measured by the hazard rate l) into a project selection. Comparing this with the
investor’s optimal selection of project reveals that R* > R
FB and p(R*) < p(R
FB).
Hence, under limited liability one ends up with excessive risk taking from a social
point of view, because the investor does not care about the whole distribution, but












What is the relationship between the socially efficient project and the nature of a
debt-financed project that an investor would implement? Could the investor
implement the project, which is socially inefficient in the sense defined above?
One might argue that if the adverse selection problems associated with investment
projects are not severe in the sense that the project has a sufficiently low hazard
rate l and if credit is available at a sufficiently competitive interest rate, then the
probability of success, p(R*), will exceed the hazard rate, l, and we would be on
the left side of R
FB. Along similar lines one might argue that if the adverse
selection problems are severe or if credit is offered at a sufficiently high interest
rate, the lending market will generate a project selection which is to the right of
R
FB. In such a case, the credit market imperfections would lead us to the
implementation of projects, which are not justified from a social point of view.
We will further analyze this question later on in our framework.
3 Lending rate determination as the outcome of
Nash bargaining
In the literature there is no unique and standardized way to characterize the
intensity of lending rate competition. In traditional oligopoly models the
consequences of increased competition are analyzed by increasing the number of
competing lenders. Another approach, frequently applied in the area of industrial13
organization, is to measure the intensity of competition by the degree of product
differentiation like for example in the Hotelling type models of horizontal
differentiation. A third way of capturing the degree of competition is to identify it
with the lender’s bargaining power relative to that of the borrower, i.e. to apply
the Nash bargaining approach. This is the approach we will employ in the
subsequent analysis. For our purposes this approach has two advantages: it both
incorporates the monopoly bank and the perfectly competitive banking solutions
as special cases and it avoids incorporation of market-specific, and often
controversial, institutional details (like the precise type of competition) of  loan
markets as a part of the analysis.
The lending rate is assumed to be determined as the outcome of a bargaining
process between the bank and the projectholder subject to the constraint that the
investor unilaterally determines the level of investment. Such a constraint reflects
the feature that the bank has no instrument for enforcing any particular project
selection. In what follows we, further, assume that zero expected profit represents
the threat point of both the projectholder and the bank. In such a situation the
determination of the lending rate can be modeled as the solution to the following
Nash bargaining problem
, 0 . t . s V Max R
1
r = p p = W
b - b (3.1)
in which b and 1–b describe the relative bargaining power of the bank and the
investor, respectively.
6 The first-order condition for this problem can be expressed
as








b - + b Û = W (3.2)
where Vr and pr denote the partial derivatives with respect to the lending rate of
the bank’s and the investor’s objective functions, respectively. Under the
assumptions made, the second order condition Wrr < 0 for the Nash bargaining
holds, so that equation (3.2) implicitly defines the optimal lending rate as a
function of the lender’s relative bargaining power b and other exogenous
parameters.
As the investor chooses the level of investment in an optimal way, we can
apply the envelope theorem to see that pr = –p(R) < 0. As for the effect of the
lending rate on the expected profit of the bank we have




r , where we have utilized the
specification (2.2) as well as equation (2.5). Clearly, it holds that Vr > 0 if b < 1.
Formally, this feature expresses that there is a conflict of interest between the
bank and the projectholder with respect to negotiation regarding the interest rate.
Substituting the derivatives mentioned above as well as the objective functions of
the bank and  the investor into the first-order condition (2.8) establishes that
                                                
6 This approach to bargaining can be justified either axiomatically (see Nash (1950)) or
strategically (see Binmore, Rubinstein and Wolinsky (1986)). Within the context of a
macroeconomic analysis of credit and labor market imperfections Wasmer and Weil (1999) have
applied the Nash bargaining approach for the determination of loan repayments.14
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Equation (3.3) describes the determination of the lending rate r as a solution to a
Nash bargaining problem. Solving (3.3) explicitly yields the interest rate, r = r
N,
associated with the Nash bargaining problem
, 1










N is determined by substituting r = r
N into (2.5) (see the equation (3.6)
later on). From the Nash bargaining solution we get as special cases the interest
rates in a lending market characterized by monopoly and perfect competition,
respectively, as
() () . 1
) R ( p
1
0 r and 1
1
1 r C
C M - = = b -
l
= = b (3.5)
From equations (3.4) and (3.5) we can see that the impact on the lending rate of
the bank’s bargaining power depends on the relationship between the probability
of success p(R
N) and the hazard rate l. Clearly, r
M  >(<) r
C when p(R
C) >(<) l.
To characterize the relationship between the probability of success and the
hazard rate and thereby the dependence of the lending rate on the degree of
competition, we next investigate how the project selection R
N, the probability of
success p(R
N) and thereby the riskiness of investment project relate to the
bargaining power of the financier. Substituting the lending rate r
N into equation
(2.5) we can directly express the project selection in the Nash solution as a
function of the bargaining power according to
.
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respectively. By comparing the equations for R
M and R
C we see again that when a
competitive lending market is monopolized, the effect on the optimal R, and on
the probability of success p(R), depends on the relationship between the
probability of success p(R) and the hazard rate l.
One has to ask what is the critical project type, which determines the limit for
the bank’s participation as a financing institution? The participation constraint for
the bank is defined by the bank’s expected profit being non-negative under Nash
bargaining. This can be obtained by substituting R
N and r
N into the bank’s

















According to (3.8) the participation constraint for the bank eliminates the
implementation of such projects, for which the probability of success would be
below the hazard rate. Therefore, in all cases where the bank has some degree of
market power so that the expected profits are positive, the probability of success
will necessarily exceed the hazard rate. On the other hand, the expected profits of
the projectholder under the Nash bargaining can be obtained by substituting R
N
and r
N into the objective function (2.3) so as to yield p
N = p(R
N)/l.
Formally, by differentiating the equations (3.4) and (3.6) with respect to the
bank’s relative bargaining power and using the specification (2.2) for the
probability of success we find the following relationships to hold



































where A = (1–(1–b)(l/p(R
N)) > 0.
The critical project type, l
~, is defined by the bank’s participation constraint
V
N = 0, and consequently, it must satisfy
() [] .
~
for 0 1 r 1 R p V
N N l = l = - + = (3.11)
How does this critical project type depend on the bank’s relative bargaining power
and thereby on the intensity of lending market competition? Differentiating
equation (3.11) with respect to b and accounting for the fact that the probability of
success depends on the bargaining power by affecting R











~)). According to (3.12) the threshold in terms of project quality
above which firms obtain loan finance does not depend on the bargaining power
of the bank, because in the Nash bargaining game the bank’s threat point is zero
regardless of its relative bargaining power.
We are now in a position to summarize our findings in
3URSRVLWLRQ:KLOHWKHVSHFWUXPRISURMHFWTXDOLWLHVREWDLQLQJORDQILQDQFHLV
LQYDULDQW WR WKH EDUJDLQLQJ SRZHU RI WKH EDQN LQWHQVLILHG OHQGLQJ PDUNHW
FRPSHWLWLRQZLOOOHDGWRORZHUOHQGLQJUDWHVDQGOHVVULVN\SURMHFWV16
Proposition 1 appeals to intuition in light of the fact that the critical project type is
determined by the bank’s participation constraint, which is independent of the
lending market structure as measured by the bank’s bargaining power. This
feature is in contrast to Petersen and Rajan (1995), who argue that bank’s
willingness to lend in the initial stage of a dynamic banking relationship increases
with the concentration of the lending market as well as to the models emphasizing
the adverse selection aspect of loan markets (see e.g. Broecker (1990), Riordan
(1993) and Shaffer (1998) or Villas-Boas and Schmidt-Mohr (1999)), where the
argument is the reverse to that by Petersen and Rajan. Our model thus suggests
that the intertemporal and adverse selection aspects represent crucial feature for
generating a relationship between lending thresholds and lending market
concentration.
4 Agency cost of debt and lending market
competition
In the previous section we have analyzed the determination of interest rates,
project selection and project riskiness as a function of the bank’s bargaining
power. We now turn to study the relationship between for the agency cost of debt
financing and lending market competition and for this purpose we identify lending
market competition with the investor’s bargaining power.
7
Under Nash bargaining the indirect profit functions of the projectholder as
well as the bank can be written as follows
() ( ) [] ()
l
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Hence, adding equations (4.1) and (4.2) yields the aggregate expected profits of
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The agency cost of debt financing associated with Nash bargaining, a
N(b), can
now be obtained as the difference between the expected project surplus generated
by the by the socially optimal project selection and that generated through the
process of Nash bargaining. Using equations (2.8) and (4.5) the agency cost of
debt financing can be expressed as
                                                
7 A related bargaining approach has been used in Haskel and Sanchis (1995) in order to evaluate
the consequences of privatization for the firm’s X-inefficiency. However, their analysis focuses on
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In particular, for the cases of a monopoly bank and banking market operating

































Differentiating the agency cost of debt financing under Nash bargaining, i.e.
equation (4.4), with respect to the bank’s relative bargaining power parameter b
and accounting for the effect of b on the rate of return, as captured by (3.9), and
thereby on the probability of success according to (2.2), yields
() () () (). R p 0
R p
1 R 1 R p a
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Thus, taking the participation constraint for the bank into account, the effect of




Hence, our present analysis does not lend support to the commonly held view that
there would be a trade-off between more intense lending market competition and
higher agency costs of debt finance as has been argued for example, by Broecker
(1990) and Riordan (1993). They have focused on how the phenomenon of
adverse selection might present mechanisms demonstrating that more intense
lending market competition may damage market performance. Although severe
adverse selection problems leading to a sufficiently low probability of success
might suggest that intensified lending competition could, in principle, increase the
agency cost of debt finance, our analysis finds that such a possibility would be
eliminated by the bank’s participation constraint. As the bank does not find it
worthwhile to finance such projects it follows that the lending market would break
down in those cases. In the absence of sufficiently severe adverse selection
problems Proposition 2 sends a strong message. Intensified lending market
competition will decrease the agency cost of debt finance by leading to lower
lending rates and less risky projects.18
5 Concluding comments
In this paper we have addressed the question of how lending market competition,
measured by the bargaining power of banks, affects the agency costs of debt
finance. It has been shown that intensified lending market competition will lead to
lower lending rates and investment return distributions which are shifted towards
lower, but less risky returns. Because intensified lending market competition
induces such an effect on the distribution of investment returns it follows that
increased lending market competition will reduce the agency cost of debt
financing. Hence our analysis does not lend support to the commonly held view
that there would be a trade-off between more intensive lending market
competition and higher agency costs of debt finance.
While our model predicts that intensified lending market competition will
reduce the agency cost of debt, the spectrum of project qualities obtaining loan
finance is invariant to the bargaining power of the bank. This feature is in contrast
to Petersen and Rajan’s (1995) intertemporal model as well as to the models
emphasizing the adverse selection aspect of loan markets (see e.g. Broecker
(1990), Riordan (1993) and Schaffer (1998) or Villas-Boas and Schmidt-Mohr
(1999)). In these models more intense lending competition either increases or
decreases the threshold of obtaining loan finance depending on whether the
intertemporal aspect or the adverse selection aspect dominates. Thus, our result
suggests that the conclusions reached in the literature are sensitive to the presence
of long-term lending relationships and adverse selection, which lie outside the
scope of our model.
Our analysis has focused on a very simple and stylized model within the
framework of which we have been able to explicitly address the relationship
between the market power of banks and agency costs induced by debt contracts as
financial instruments. As the analysis of Brander and Poitevin (1992)
demonstrates there might be important interactions between agency costs at
different hierarchical levels. An interesting direction for further research might be
to investigate the interactions between the agency costs of debt identified in the
present model with aspects of internal agency relationships within firms obtaining
loans. Similarly, it might also be interesting to investigate how the agency costs of
debt are related to strategic product market interaction between funded projects.19
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